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Purpose 
 
We use firm-level data to investigate changes in the economic importance of performance-
related-pay (PRP) in Britain through the 2000s. 
 
Design/methodology/approach 
 
We utilise nationally-representative, monthly data on the total wage bill and employment of 
around 8,500 firms. Using these data, we decompose the share of the total economy-wide 
wage bill accounted for by bonuses into the shares of employment in the PRP and non-PRP 
sectors, the ratio of base pay between the two sectors, and the gearing of bonus payments to 
base pay within the PRP sector.  
 
Findings 
 
The growth in the economic importance of bonuses in Britain in the mid-2000s – and 
subsequent fluctuations since the onset of recession in 2008 – can be almost entirely 
explained by changes in the gearing of bonus to base pay within the PRP sector. There has 
been no substantial change in the percentage of employment accounted for by PRP firms; if 
anything it has fallen over time. Furthermore, movements in the gearing of bonuses to base 
pay in the economy are heavily influenced by changes in Finance: a sector which accounts 
for a large proportion of all bonus payments in Britain.  
 
Research implications 
 
The paper demonstrates the importance of understanding further how firms decide the size of 
bonus payments in a given period. 
 
Originality/value 
 
Ours is the first paper to present monthly firm-level data for the Britain on the incidence and 
size of bonus payments in the 2000s. 
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1. Introduction 
Labour economists ascribe great importance to performance-related pay (PRP) because, 
compared to paying fixed time-rate wages, it provides opportunities to increase labour 
productivity by inducing additional effort and attracting high ability workers (Lazear, 1986; 
Prendergast, 1999).  There is abundant empirical evidence in support of these propositions in 
settings as diverse as windshield repairs (Lazear, 2000), strawberry picking (Bandiera et al., 
2007), and tree planting (Shearer, 2004).  Given its economic benefits, one might expect the 
incidence of PRP to be high in market-oriented economies. Yet the research literature has 
provided ample evidence of the hidden costs of PRP (Prendergast, 1999: 21-33; Frick et al, 
2015), and early studies found PRP was less pervasive than might have been anticipated if it 
was optimal for most firms. 
It is perhaps for this reason that Lemieux et al.’s (2009) seminal paper (LMP hereafter) 
attracted so much attention. Using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) they found 
the incidence of PRP jobs in the United States increased from 38 per cent in the late 1970s to 
around 45 per cent in the 1990s. More telling still, they speculated that secular changes in 
technology might lie behind the growth of PRP.  The first of these changes is skills-biased 
technical change (SBTC) which has increased demand for skilled labour in industrialised 
economies, inducing employers to attract the most able workers by linking their rewards to 
performance. The second potential technical reason for the growth of PRP has been the 
advances in information and communication technologies which have reduced the costs of 
collecting and processing information about worker performance (op. cit., 3). Since these 
trends in SBTC and monitoring costs are likely to be pervasive across advanced market-
oriented economies, albeit to varying degrees, it is conceivable that they may have led to 
further growth in the use of PRP in the US in recent years, and to growth in other countries. 
However, recent studies inspired by LMP have raised important questions about current 
trends, at least for the United States. First, using establishment data from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics' Employer Costs for Employee Compensation (ECEC) series (which derives from 
the National Compensation Survey), Gittleman and Pierce (2013a) show the proportion of 
jobs with performance pay rose in the 1990s, only to fall in the 2000s such that, by 2013, it 
had declined by about one-fifth in the period since LMP's study period. They test various 
possible reasons for the decline, but none have much explanatory power.  However, they do 
show that, although the decline is apparent throughout the wage distribution and within 
industry and occupation, it is concentrated among lower earners. Second, a series of papers 
have begun to question whether there is positive selection into PRP on ability. Using the 
PSID used by LMP, Heywood and Parent (2012) show that, among men, the tendency for 
observationally more able employees to enter PRP jobs is only apparent for whites, not 
blacks. Indeed they say "if anything [we find] evidence that high-ability blacks sort out of 
performance pay" (op. cit.: 281). In a second paper using the National Longitudinal Survey of 
Youth (NLSY), Heywood and Parent (2013) find skilled fathers select into performance pay 
jobs, whereas skilled mothers select out of performance jobs.  These findings are not 
consistent with the standard assumptions regarding workers sorting into performance pay 
jobs on ability, and suggest that any increase in PRP incidence driven by SBTC may not be as 
straightforward as LMP imply. 
These studies raise questions about recent trends in PRP in other market-oriented economies. 
Cross-sectional comparative studies find low PRP incidence rates of around 10-15 per cent in 
many European countries, compared to around 40 per cent in the United States. Only 
Scandinavian countries seem to approach the PRP incidence levels of the United States 
(Bryson et al., 2013). But have other countries experienced any recent growth in PRP?  This 
paper focuses on developments in Britain, a country in the lower half of international 
rankings in terms of the percentage of employees who said they were in receipt of PRP in the 
mid-2000s (Bryson et al., 2013). Evidence from the periodic Workplace Employment 
Relations Survey (WERS) series has indicated that the percentage of all workplaces in Britain 
using PRP schemes increased between 1984 and 2004, though the increase was far from 
uniform across different types of PRP (Pendleton et al., 2009). However, the latest WERS, 
conducted in 2011, suggests that PRP has reached a plateau and that, in the case of employee 
share plans, usage has actually fallen (Van Wanrooy et al., 2013). The emerging picture for 
Britain thus has some resonance with that portrayed by Gittleman and Pierce (2013a) for the 
United States.  There is little else by way of evidence on trends in PRP in Britain however.  
One exception is the research undertaken by Bell and Van Reenen (2010, 2013) which 
indicates that annual bonuses have played an important role in the growth of wage dispersion 
at the top of the earnings distribution, especially in Finance, a sector which is more 
significant for the UK economy than it is for the US. 
We contribute to this literature by mapping the incidence of PRP using firm-level data that 
have never before been used in this literature.  These data are the Monthly Wages and 
Salaries Survey (MWSS) which are the basis for the Office for National Statistics' Annual 
Earnings Index.  The MWSS is a monthly survey which employers are required to complete 
under statute.  They are therefore high quality, high frequency data.i  The survey is large 
(circa 8,500 observations per month) and is a census of all large firms and a rotating panel of 
smaller firms.  We use the data to test hypotheses regarding secular and cyclical trends in 
PRP.  
We have four main findings.  First, we show that there was some growth in the share of total 
pay accounted for by bonuses in the mid-2000s. Second, we show that this rise – and 
subsequent fluctuations – can be almost entirely explained by changes in the gearing (or 
multiplier) that is applied to base pay in the PRP sector. In contrast, there has been no 
increase in the percentage of employment accounted for by PRP firms; if anything it has 
fallen over the past decade. Third, bonuses are shown to be more cyclical than base pay, such 
that the overall share of wages paid out in bonuses fell during the recent recession. Fourth, 
movements in the gearing of bonuses to base pay in the economy at large are heavily 
influenced by changes in the Finance industry: a sector which accounts for a large proportion 
of all bonus payments in the British economy. One implication is that further research is 
needed on how firms – particularly in Finance but also elsewhere in the economy – decide 
upon the appropriate size of bonus payments for their workers from one period to the next.  
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section Two briefly reviews the literature and 
outlines our key hypotheses. Section Three introduces our data and presents our empirical 
strategy for describing and analysing the data. Section Four presents our results. Section Five 
concludes. 
2. Literature and Hypotheses on the Changing Incidence of PRP 
Both the incidence of PRP and the size of performance-related payments to employees are 
contested issues in the literature. There is good economic evidence that PRP elicits greater 
worker effort and can improve labour productivity (see Bryson et al., 2013, for a review).  
Thus, one might anticipate a high incidence of PRP in the economy, at least in the market-
oriented sector seeking to maximise profits.  Consequently, evidence suggesting that its 
incidence is patchy and that, even when it is present, it forms a relatively small percentage of 
total pay, are met with some surprise and even scepticism.  
PRP is not necessarily optimal in some settings, however. For instance, where it is difficult to 
link the effort or performance of particular workers directly to output, it may not make sense 
to resort to PRP, and employers may instead prefer to incentivise employees using other 
instruments such as career progression via promotion (Prendergast, 1999), as is often the case 
in professions and parts of the public sector.ii Equally, where intrinsic motivation is strong, an 
emphasis on monetary rewards can prove counterproductive (see Benabou and Tirole, 2003). 
Moreover, workers may not wish to share the employer's risk associated with firm or 
individual performance, preferring instead a standard base wage which does not vary with 
performance or, if it does vary, for the sensitivity of pay to performance to be relatively low 
(see Dohmen and Falk, 2011).iii  Employers, recognising the need to trade off efficiency 
against insurance, may choose to set the elasticity of pay to performance well below that 
which might be optimal for profit maximisation. Finally, employers and workers may be 
wary of the potentially negative consequences of increased wage inequality arising from PRP 
(see Levine, 1991).  
International evidence from employee-level data for the mid-2000s indicates that  the 
percentage of employees in receipt of PRP varies markedly across countries from around 10-
15 per cent in most European countries, rising to around 40 per cent in Scandinavia and the 
United States (Bryson et al., 2013).  No such comparative evidence exists with respect to the 
size of performance payments or their share of total wages. 
It is against this backdrop that we test the following hypotheses. 
H1: There has been a secular rise in the use of PRP in Britain 
There are several reasons why one might expect PRP to have grown over time.  These relate 
to falling worker bargaining power, greater potential benefits of PRP to firms, changes in 
tasks and production technology, and shifts in the composition of occupations.  
As noted earlier, the declining costs of the technologies required to monitor output may 
encourage increased use of PRP (McGovern et al, 2007) and skills-biased technological 
change (SBTC) increases the demand for highly productive workers who may be attracted by 
PRP (LMP, 2009: 3). Bryson et al. (2013) show the likelihood of receiving PRP rises with 
employee job autonomy in both the United States and Europe and that, in Europe, it also rises 
among those performing more complex tasks. If SBTC has also resulted in a task-based 
polarisation of jobs in the economy, the growth of highly skilled autonomous working at the 
top end of the occupational distribution may also be conducive to the use of PRP.iv For all 
these reasons one might expect to see growth in the use of PRP over time and, perhaps, a 
bigger gearing of pay to performance where PRP is used.  
A variant of this hypothesis is that production processes are developing in such a way as to 
limit the use of traditional individual PRP, such as piece rates, with employers substituting 
them instead with group-based incentives that complement team-oriented working that 
characterises an increasing proportion of work settings. Freeman and Kleiner (2005) note the 
demise of individual PRP in American manufacturing, while Dube and Freeman (2010) and  
Kruse et al. (2010) point to substantial growth in financial participation schemes and group-
based PRP. However, both group-based PRP and individual PRP have been rising in Europe 
(Bryson et al., 2013), perhaps because merit pay - based on subjective assessments of 
employee performance by managers and supervisors - has been substituting for other forms 
of individual PRP.  
LMP (2009) also link the rise of PRP in the United States to the demise of trade unionism 
which, they suggest, has acted as a constraint on the use of PRP. Using panel data from the 
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) for the United States, O'Halloran (2013) 
finds that, while there is a negative correlation between unions and most forms of PRP, the 
opposite is true for piece-rates. Britain has seen a continued decline in unionisation over the 
last decade (Bryson and Forth, 2011; Van Wanrooy et al., 2013).  If one accepts the 
contention that unions act as a constraint on the use of PRP, then one might anticipate their 
waning influence to translate into a secular rise in the use of PRP in Britain. Evidence 
through to 2004 indicates a rise in the workplace incidence of PRP in Britain in the previous 
quarter-century, although there is no clear evidence that this rise is linked to union decline 
(Pendleton et al., 2009). 
In spite of there being a variety of potential influences on the growth of PRP, it is also 
acknowledged in the literature that PRP schemes do not always work as intended. The 
dangers inherent in PRP include sabotage, ratchet effects (gaming), and the exclusive focus 
on incentivised targets to exclusion of other desirable outcomes.  These problems may lead 
firms to abandon PRP and, indeed, there is evidence that firms do switch out of, as well as 
into, performance-related pay (e.g. Belfield and Marsden, 2003). It is thus not inevitable that 
the incidence of PRP will rise over time. As noted earlier, Gittleman and Pierce (2013a) used 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics' Employee Costs for Employee Compensation (ECEC) data set 
to show that the percentage of jobs with PRP in the United States fell by 10 percentage points 
in the 2000s such that their incidence is now lower than it was in the period covered by 
LMP's (2009) PSID study. This is the first evidence that the continued growth in PRP 
anticipated by some analysts has not materialised. 
H2: PRP is pro-cyclical  
Some maintain that PRP schemes are sometimes little more than a pay relabeling exercise. 
For example, firms respond to tax incentives when setting up profit-related pay and share 
ownership plans because they are treated as tax-efficient payment methods.  This observation 
may help explain international differences in the incidence of financial participation schemes 
(Bryson et al., 2013) and the otherwise hard-to-explain changes in the use of share ownership 
plans and profit-related pay in Britain (Pendleton et al., 2009). Nevertheless, in most 
instances it seems reasonable to assume that PRP schemes are genuine efforts by employers 
to link their employees' pay to their own performance or that of the firm, whether as an 
incentive, or as a means of sharing the risks (or profits) arising from fluctuations in market 
conditions. Blanchflower et al (1996) provide evidence that wages change in response to 
sectoral profitability. Therefore we should expect pro-cyclical movement in payments for 
performance because, on average, one expects individual firms' fortunes to rise and fall with 
those of the rest of the economy. Fixed base wages may also adjust to macro-economic 
conditions, but we would expect them to be much less responsive to economic conditions 
than PRP, and any adjustment we do observe is likely to be less pronounced than the 
adjustment in performance payments.   
Among employees in general there is evidence for Britain that real earnings have become 
more sensitive to unemployment since the early 2000s (Gregg and Machin, 2012).  Although 
the authors do not investigate how much of this sensitivity is associated with the incidence 
and size of PRP, the magnitude of the change is such that much of it is likely due to the 
increased sensitivity of base pay.v Empirical support for sensitivity of pay-to-performance is 
found in the executive pay literature where most or all of the adjustment in compensation 
comes through performance bonuses and related options.  However, Bell and Van Reenen 
(2011) find non-executive pay is much less sensitive to firm performance.  They argue this is 
because "only senior executives have a large enough share of pay in bonuses to generate a 
sizeable overall effect on pay" (p. 1) while base pay remains relatively insensitive to firm 
performance. 
Whether firms’ propensity to use PRP schemes is affected by the business cycle is less 
certain, a priori. It will depend, in part, on the bargaining power of workers and firms.  
Employers may be more eager to share income risks with workers in economic downturns 
through the promotion of PRP, whereas workers may prefer PRP in economic upswings when 
there are larger rents to share. Industrial relations scholars point to the inertia in payment 
systems and the transaction costs associated with changing schemes, considerations which 
imply movement in and out of PRP is likely to be less responsive to the business cycle than 
we might otherwise anticipate. Using a very broad definition of performance pay, Gittleman 
and Pierce (2013b) suggest that the steep decline in the number of hours compensated with 
PRP in the United States since the early 2000s is most likely due to "cyclical factors related 
to the Great Recession".  
H3: Explanations for trends in performance-related pay in Britain will be dominated by what 
happens in the Finance sector 
Performance-related pay is more common in some sectors and occupations than others due to 
the role employees perform in generating sales or increasing production. For example, piece 
rate work is often associated with production line manufacturing while commission on sales 
is common in Retail. The British economy has a larger Finance sector than most developed 
economies due to the role of the City of London as a centre for listing and trading public 
listed company shares and for trading and investment more generally. Bonuses are an 
important method by which firms recruit, retain and motivate bankers, traders and other 
corporate executives. Some have identified bonus payments to bankers as an important 
component of recent growth in wage dispersion in Britain (Bell and Van Reenen, 2013), 
while others have speculated whether any increase in the bonus gearing of payments to 
traders may have induced risky behaviours which may have contributed to the recent 
financial crisis. Given the size of the Finance sector in Britain and the traditionally important 
role of bonuses in the sector we hypothesise that bonus activity in the Finance sector may 
have played an important role in explaining economy-level movements in bonuses in Britain. 
3. Data 
Our results are based on analyses of the Monthly Wages and Salaries Survey (MWSS). The 
MWSS is conducted each month by the Office for National Statistics and provides data for 
around 8,500 enterprises in Britain. The sample of enterprises (strictly, reporting units) is 
drawn from the Inter-Departmental Business Register according to a variable probability 
design. A census is conducted among enterprises with 1,000 or more employees; the 
sampling fractions then decline through three further strata (500-999 employees; 100-499 
employees; and 20-99 employees). Enterprises with fewer than 20 employees are not 
included in the survey. The survey covers all industries. Our data cover the period January 
2000 to March 2013. 
The survey contains data on total gross pay for the enterprise in the survey month, as well as 
the amount of bonus/commission (i.e. PRP) included in total gross pay. Separate totals are 
collected for all weekly-paid and all monthly-paid employees.vi Bonuses are measured by the 
survey in the month of payment, rather than during the period over which they are earned. All 
bonuses are included, with respondents being instructed to include: bonuses; commission; 
performance pay; annual profit from profit-related pay schemes; long-service awards; and – 
for sporting professions – appearance money. Changes in the way the data were collected 
mean there is a clear likelihood of under-reporting before the year 2000, so we begin our 
analysis of MWSS at this point.  
Participation in the survey is compulsory and so a high response rate is achieved (around 85 
per cent each month). Enterprises with 1,000 or more employees thus typically appear in the 
survey dataset each month. Enterprises which enter the sample with 20-999 employees are 
retained for up to five years before being rotated out. It is therefore possible to observe many 
individual firms at monthly intervals over a considerable period of time, and so to observe 
changes in the size of bonus payments within firms, both within and across years.  
Whilst our analysis is based on the MWSS microdata provided via the UK Secure Data 
Service, we can confirm that we are able to use these microdata to replicate ONS’ published 
statistics for Average Weekly Earnings (for which MWSS is the source).  
In regression analyses we link the MWSS reporting units to their associated enterprise 
records in the Business Structure Database (BSD) – an annual extract from the UK’s official 
business register – as a means of extending the list of firm characteristics, which is limited in 
MWSS. This linkage is feasible for around 95 per cent of all MWSS records, and at least 85 
per cent in each year.  
4. Results 
Figure 1 presents data from the MWSS showing the average real wage bill per employee in 
each month from January 2000 through to March 2013 for the whole economy.  The chart 
shows separate series which include and exclude bonus payments.  The figures are in British 
pounds per week at 2012 prices.  The spikes in bonus payments capture the within-year 
variation that is caused by the timing of annual bonuses, typically paid in the period between 
December and March to reflect individual or collective performance over the previous 12 
months.  
Base pay rises gently until the onset of recession in July 2008 when it flattens and then begins 
to fall.  Total pay follows a similar pattern, but the rise in total pay steepens between 2005 
and 2008, with bonus pay appearing to constitute a rising percentage of total pay in this 
period. The fall in total pay in 2008/9 also seems sharper than that seen in base pay. 
Nonetheless, whereas base pay continues to be subdued in 2010, bonus pay bounces back – 
albeit not to its pre-recession peak. Figure 2 charts the share of total pay that is attributed to 
bonus payments and confirms that this share rose in the mid 2000s (particularly between 
2005 and 2008). The share fell back in 2009 – although only to the level seen in the first half 
of the decade – before regaining much of its ground in 2010. After this point, end-of-year 
bonuses appear to fall slightly, whilst it appears that those paid at other points in the year may 
have risen.  
[INSERT FIGURES 1 AND 2 HERE] 
 The broad patterns are thus evident from Figures 1 and 2, but the exact scale and timing of 
the changes is difficult to discern from the charts because of the seasonality of bonus 
payments. To show these movements more clearly, we aggregate the monthly data into the 
two bonus seasons, namely the "low season" which runs from April to November, when 
bonus payments typically average around five per cent of total wages, and the "high season" 
which runs from December to March, when they typically average around ten per cent. 
Figure 3 then charts the growth rate in the bonus share between one season and its equivalent 
in the following year (e.g. the first bar shows that the bonus share in the high season of 2001 
was proportionally 14 per cent larger than the bonus share in the high season of 2000).vii The 
chart shows that the growth rates in the mid-2000s were similar irrespective of the season. 
The absolute growth in the bonus share was larger within the ‘high season’ series: the share 
rose from a low of 8.2 per cent in 2003 to a peak of 13.1 per cent in 2007, whereas “low 
season” bonuses rose from 3.6 per cent to 5.0 per cent over the same period. However the 
proportionate growth in each series was similar. The chart also confirms that there has been 
no consistent pattern over the last three years of our series.  
[INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE] 
These movements in the bonus share are intriguing and, intuitively, we can expect that they 
may arise through a number of different mechanisms. One possible explanation for the 
growth in the mid-2000s is that there was an expansion in the share of all firms using PRP, 
with a consequent decline in the share of firms paying only fixed wages. Another possibility, 
which might intuitively explain some of the cyclicality in the bonus share, is that there have 
been changes in the size of bonuses paid out by PRP firms. We can therefore better 
understand the causes of movements in bonus payments if we decompose the bonus share 
into its constituent components.  
In any given economy, the share of all wages paid out in bonuses in period t (the ‘bonus 
share’ for period t, or Bt) is computed as the ratio between the sum of all bonus payments 
(Bont) and the sum of all wages (TotWaget). That is: 
     𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡 =  𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡     (1) 
The sum of all bonus payments in period t can be written as:  
       𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡 =  𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵. ?̅?𝑟𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵.𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵     (2) 
Where: 
𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡
𝐵𝐵  is the total number of employees in firms that paid bonuses in period t  
?̅?𝑟𝑡𝑡
𝐵𝐵 is average regular (or base) pay per employee in these firms in period t 
𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡
𝐵𝐵 is the multiple of all regular pay that is added to the wage bill in the form of bonus 
payments in bonus-paying firms (that is, the gearing of bonus pay to base pay within 
bonus-paying firms). This gearing is necessarily zero in non bonus-paying firms (𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁=0). 
Similarly, the sum of all wages paid out in the economy can be expressed as the sum of: all 
bonuses paid out in bonus-paying firms; all regular pay paid out in bonus-paying firms; and 
all regular pay paid out in non bonus-paying firms. That is: 
     𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 =  𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵 . ?̅?𝑟𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵.𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵 +  ?̅?𝑟𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵.𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵 +  ?̅?𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁 .𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁   (3) 
Where: 
𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡
𝑁𝑁 is the total number of employees in firms that did not pay bonuses in period t 
?̅?𝑟𝑡𝑡
𝑁𝑁 is average regular (or base) pay per employee in these firms in period t. 
Let 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 refer to the ratio between average regular pay per employee in bonus-paying firms 
and average regular pay per employee in non bonus-paying firms. We call this the ‘regular 
pay premium’ (or ‘base pay premium’) in favour of the average employee in a bonus-paying 
firm: 
      𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 =  ?̅?𝑟𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵?̅?𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁      (4) 
And let 𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 refer to the ratio between total employment in bonus-paying firms and total 
employment in non bonus-paying firms. We call this the ‘employment premium’ in favour of 
bonus-paying firms: 
      𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 =   𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁      (5) 
Substituting (2) and (3) into (1) and dividing all terms through by 1
?̅?𝑟𝑡𝑡
𝑁𝑁.𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁 we then obtain the 
following: 
     𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡 =  𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵.𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡.𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵.𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡.𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 + 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡.𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 + 1    (6) 
The aggregate bonus share in the economy (the share of all wages attributed to bonus 
payments) is thus a function of: 
(a) The ratio of employment in bonus paying firms to employment in non-bonus-paying 
firms (the employment premium in favour of bonus-paying firms) (EPt) 
(b) The ratio of average base pay per employee in bonus-paying firms to average base 
pay in non-bonus-paying firms (the base pay premium) (RPt), and  
(c)  the gearing within bonus-paying firms (the multiplier that bonus-paying firms 
notionally apply to base pay) (𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵).  
For instance, if the employment premium is 1.10 (bonus-paying firms employ 52.5% of all 
employees in the economy), the pay premium is 1.05 (average base wages in bonus-paying 
firms are 5% higher than in non bonus-paying firms), and bonus-paying firms pay out 
bonuses to the value of 10% of base pay (a gearing of 0.10, which implies that total pay is 
1.10 times the value of base pay), then the overall share of wages attributable to bonus 
payments is 5.1%.  
Tracking the movement in each of these three series over time indicates whether one 
component has moved more than another over the period in question; Figure 4 shows the 
monthly trend over our period of observation. It is apparent that the most substantial change - 
both from month to month and over time - is in the gearing of bonus pay to base pay in PRP 
firms. The ratio of base pay in PRP and non-PRP firms is flat in comparison.  The 
employment ratio is also relatively flat overall, but drifting slowly downwards. The 
suggestion here is that firms’ propensity to pay PRP has, if anything, been declining, but that 
movements in the gearing of bonus pay to base pay are at least as important in understanding 
changes in the economic importance of performance pay over time.  
[INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE] 
The broad changes are again easier to discern if the monthly data are aggregated into bonus 
seasons. Figures 5 and 6 undertake this aggregation and also index each of the three series on 
the year 2000 (i.e. 2000 = 100). Changes in the gearing within PRP firms are the dominant 
feature of both the "high" and "low" season charts.  
[INSERT FIGURES 5 AND 6 HERE] 
We use the values underlying Figures 5 and 6 as the basis for a shift-share analysis in order to 
show the influence of changes in EPt,  RPt and GB in explaining changes in the total share of 
the wage bill accounted for by bonuses (B). This analysis is presented in Table 1 and 
confirms that it is the change in gearing - that is, the ratio of bonuses to base pay within the 
PRP sector - that explains most of the changing contribution of bonus pay to total pay. The 
fourth row in Part A of the table shows, for example, that the bonus share (B) fell by 4.38 
percentage points between the high season of 2007 and the high season of 2009, and that 4.29 
percentage points of this fall could be attributed to the decline in the gearing (G) from 27.3% 
in 2007 to 17.5% in 2009; the fall in the employment premium (EP) from 1.16 to 1.14 
accounted for the remaining 0.13 percentage points of the overall decline in B.  Indeed, in 
each row of Table 1 we see that changes in the relative size of the PRP and non-PRP sectors, 
and changes in the relative levels of base pay in the two sectors, contribute relatively little to 
changes in the overall bonus share when compared with the influence of changes in the 
gearing in PRP firms. This is the case in both the "high" and "low" seasons. 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
To see whether compositional changes in the firm population - such as a shift in the sectoral 
profile of employment - can account for changes in the bonus share – or its major 
determinant, the gearing -  we switch to regression models. These regressions focus on the 
annual movement in the gearing (G) and bonus share (B), within each season, after 
controlling for a range of firm characteristics taken from the MWSS and BSD.viii The 
reference year for this examination of time trends is 2003. Figure 7 shows the annual 
coefficients from these regressions after controlling for compositional changes, confirming 
statistically significant increases in each series over the mid-2000s. The full results are 
presented in Appendix Table A1.ix  
[INSERT FIGURE 7 HERE] 
Table 1 (Part A, column 5) showed that, in the "high" season, there was a statistically 
significant increase of about 5 percentage points in the total pay bill accounted for by bonuses 
between 2003 and 2008. Figure 7 (upper right panel) shows that just under half of this is 
accounted for by compositional change in firms, but there remains a statistically significant 
rise of almost three percentage points in the bonus share over the period.x Correspondingly, 
none of the 11 percentage point high-season increase in the gearing of bonuses to base pay 
over the same period can be accounted for by compositional changes. Similar trends are 
apparent in the "low" season, though the magnitudes are smaller.  
We infer from the analysis above that there was a growth in the economic importance of PRP 
in Britain in the mid-2000s.  This arose through increases in the size of bonus payments 
relative to base pay in PRP firms, rather than a growth in the proportion of all firms using 
PRP. It was not merely the product of changes in the make-up of the economy. .  
As the employment series in Figures 5 and 6 look broadly flat during the period in the mid-
2000s when the bonus share was growing, this suggests that individual firms were changing 
their behaviour in respect of bonuses over this period. The alternative proposition is that the 
growth in the bonus share arose from significant churning in the population (i.e. entry and 
exit from the PRP sector). We find that this is not the case. Table 2 shows that, within the 
subset of firms that we observe paying PRP in both periods (2003 and 2007), the same 
increase in gearing was evident as seen among the population at large. Put simply, the 
aggregate changes were not merely the product of switching or entry and exit; instead 
changes in the gearing of bonuses to base pay within continuing firms were economically the 
more important feature of the PRP landscape over this period.  
[TABLE 2 HERE] 
Turning back to the aggregate trend in bonus payments, the fact that the rise in the bonus 
share ceased in 2008 with the onset of recession indicates some pro-cyclicality in bonus 
payments which exceeded any pro-cyclicality in base pay. To investigate this issue further, 
we augmented our dataset with a measure of monthly GDP (NIESR, 2015) and examined the 
relative elasticities of bonuses and base wages with respect to movements in national output. 
The output measure is the three-month moving average of monthly GDP. We compute the 
monthly growth rate in this three-month moving average and use this as our indicator of the 
business cycle. From our MWSS dataset we compute the equivalent three-month moving 
averages for total pay, bonus pay and base pay per employee, along with the three-month 
moving average of the bonus share (the share of all wages paid out as bonuses in the 
economy in a given month). We then compute the monthly growth rate in each of these 
measures and regress each in turn on the growth rate in GDP, adding month fixed effects to 
each regression in order to control for the strong seasonality in total pay and bonus pay. The 
results are presented in Table 3. They show that bonuses are indeed more responsive than 
base pay to the business cycle. This is evident both in the fact that the elasticity of total 
payments with respect to changes in GDP is greater than the elasticity of base pay (the 
coefficients in models 1 and 3 are statistically significant from one another at the 5% level: 
κ2=4.64, p=0.03), and also in the fact that movements in the bonus share and GDP are 
positively correlated (p=0.048).    
 [TABLE 3 HERE] 
So far our analyses have been conducted for the whole economy but, as noted earlier, the 
Finance sector has traditionally played an important role in bonus payments in Britain. The 
Finance sector is important in any discussion of performance pay because its firms are the 
most likely of those in any sector to pay bonuses and those bonuses tend to be very large. 
Table 4 shows the economic significance of the Finance sector in respect of bonuses, by 
computing the share of all bonus pay – and the share of all base pay - that was paid out to 
Finance sector workers in our sample period. The share of all bonus pay going to workers in 
the Finance sector is around two-fifths, but in contrast, they account for only 7 per cent of 
base pay. Finance is the dominant player in the aggregate picture on bonuses in the British 
economy.  
 [INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
This raises a question about the size and direction of movements in the gearing and the bonus 
share across the economy, once the dominant influence of Finance is removed.  Repeating 
our regression analysis after having excluded firms from the Finance sector, we find the 
trends are much less dramatic than for the whole economy: there is still some growth in 
bonus pay, but it is considerably smaller in absolute terms. Again, however, it is changes in 
the gearing that are critical in driving the overall picture. Without Finance, the bonus share in 
the economy rises by around 1 percentage point between 2003 and 2007 in both the high and 
low-season series. All of this increase is caused by changes in the gearing of bonuses to base 
pay within the PRP sector, which rises by around 2 percentage points in either series. There is 
then a countervailing effect which arises from a decline in the size of the PRP sector (which 
is similar in magnitude to the whole-economy decline shown in Table 2).xi 
What these results highlight is that much of the dramatic change in the bonus share seen in 
the economy at large can be attributed to movements in the gearing ratio of bonuses to base 
pay within the Finance sector. Outside the Finance sector, the changes have been 
considerably more modest. But even here, the gearing (the multiplier that PRP firms opt to 
apply to the fixed part of their wage bill when deciding on the total amount of remuneration 
in the firm) is the key factor. And whilst the variations are less important economically once 
one moves outside of Finance, the broad trends are nonetheless similar.  
5. Conclusion 
Despite its potential to raise productivity, performance-related-pay (PRP) is not widespread 
in market-oriented economies. Furthermore, despite secular changes conducive to its take-up, 
there is mixed evidence as to whether it has become more prominent over time. Ours is the 
first paper to present firm-level data for the Britain on both the incidence and size of bonus 
payments in the 2000s.  We decompose the share of the total wage bill accounted for by 
bonuses into the shares of employment in the PRP and non-PRP sectors, the ratio of base pay 
between the two sectors, and the gearing of bonus payments to base pay within the PRP 
sector. We hypothesise that there will have been a secular rise in the use of PRP in Britain 
and show that there was some growth in the share of total pay accounted for by bonuses in 
Britain in the mid-2000s. However this rise – and subsequent fluctuations since the onset of 
recession in 2008 – can be almost entirely explained by changes in the gearing of bonus to 
base pay within the PRP sector. There has been no substantial change in the percentage of 
employment accounted for by PRP firms; if anything it has fallen over the past decade.  
As the share of wages paid out in bonuses fell in recession, this suggests that bonuses are 
procyclical. We show that this is indeed the case by augmenting our dataset with a measure 
of national output and demonstrating that the cyclicality of bonuses is greater than for base 
pay. Finally, we hypothesise that aggregate patterns of PRP in Britain will be heavily 
influenced by practice in the Finance sector. We show that the Finance industry accounts for 
a large proportion of all bonus payments in the British economy, and we also show that the 
movements in the gearing of bonuses to base pay in the economy at large are considerably 
muted once the Finance sector is set aside. . One implication is that further research is needed 
on how firms – particularly in Finance but also elsewhere in the economy – decide upon the 
appropriate size of bonus payments for their workers from one period to the next. 
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Figure 1: Total pay with and without bonuses, whole economy 
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Figure 2: Bonuses as a percentage of the total weekly pay bill, whole economy 
 
 
Figure 3: Growth rate in bonuses compared to previous season, whole economy 
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Figure 4: Decomposition of change in proportion of wage bill accounted for by bonuses 
 
 
Figure 5: Movement in components explaining change in bonus payments as percentage of 
total wage bill during "high" season (index where 2000=100) 
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Figure 6: Movement in components explaining change in bonus payments as percentage of 
total wage bill during "low" season (index where 2000=100) 
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Figure 7: Movements in gearing and bonus share, high season and low season, after 
controlling for changes in the composition of the economy 
  
  
Source: Monthly Wages and Salaries Survey 
Notes: Point estimates represent coefficients from regressions with controls for changes in the 
composition of the economy (Reference = 2003). Capped bars show 95% confidence intervals. Full 
results are presented in Table A1. 
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Table 1: Shift-share analysis accounting for change in proportion of all pay accounted for by bonuses, selected years 
 
Part A: High season 
 
 EP RP GB B 
Change 
in B 
Due to 
EP 
Due to 
RP 
Due to 
GB Residual 
Start 2000 1.07 1.03 17.8% 8.6% 
   
 
 Trough 2003 1.16 1.05 16.3% 8.2% -0.32 0.29 0.08 -0.66 -0.03 
Peak 2007 1.16 1.05 27.3% 13.1% 4.84 0.01 0.00 4.83 0.00 
Trough 2009 1.14 1.05 17.5% 8.7% -4.38 -0.13 0.00 -4.29 0.04 
Peak 2011 1.04 1.05 22.6% 10.5% 1.80 -0.34 -0.02 2.25 -0.08 
End 2013 1.06 1.06 19.1% 9.2% -1.32 0.10 0.04 -1.45 -0.02 
Source: Monthly Wages and Salaries Survey 
 
Part B: Low season 
 
 EP RP GB B 
Change 
in B 
Due to 
EP 
Due to 
RP 
Due to 
GB Residual 
Start 2000 1.12 1.02 7.8% 4.0% 
   
 
 Trough 2003 1.10 1.03 7.0% 3.6% -0.38 -0.03 0.02 -0.38 0.00 
Peak 2007 1.12 1.04 9.8% 5.0% 1.37 0.03 0.00 1.32 0.01 
Trough 2010 1.00 1.03 7.7% 3.8% -1.20 -0.25 -0.01 -0.99 0.05 
End 2012 1.02 1.05 9.0% 4.4% 0.66 0.03 0.03 0.60 0.01 
Source: Monthly Wages and Salaries Survey 
 
  
Table 2: Variations in gearing, 2003 and 2007 
 
Source: Monthly Wages and Salaries Survey 
 
 
Table 3: The elasticity of bonus pay and base pay with respect to changes in GDP 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] 
 
Δ Average total 
pay per 
employee 
Δ Average bonus 
pay per 
employee 
Δ Average base 
pay per 
employee 
Δ Bonus share 
Δ Monthly GDP 0.535* 5.144* 0.204** 4.394* 
 
[2.55] [2.06] [2.89] [1.99] 
Observations 159 159 159 159 
t-statistics in brackets; *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
Source: Monthly Wages and Salaries Survey and NIESR (2015) 
See text for variable definitions. 
 
 
Table 4: Sectoral shares of all base pay and bonus pay, Jan 2000 – March 2013 
 NACE Rev 1.1 
Section(s) 
Share of all 
bonus pay 
Share of all 
regular pay 
Finance  J 39% 7% 
Other private services  G-I, K, O 45% 45% 
Production A-F 15% 21% 
Public services L-N 1% 26% 
Total  100% 100% 
Source: Monthly Wages and Salaries Survey 
 
High season Low season 
 
2003 2007 2003 2007 
Firms paying PRP in both 
years 15% 25% 7% 10% 
Appendix A 
 
Table A1: Regressions for employment share, gearing and bonus share in "high" and "low" seasons, whole economy 
 
 
High season 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 Gearing Gearing Gearing Bonus share Bonus share Bonus share 
Sample: All BSD-linked BSD-linked All BSD-linked BSD-linked 
Controls: No No Yes No No Yes 
2000 0.015 -0.002 0.004 0.003 -0.002 -0.003 
 [1.03] [-0.11] [0.21] [0.50] [-0.33] [-0.60] 
2001 0.031* 0.010 0.009 0.015* 0.006 0.000 
 
[2.20] [0.73] [0.53] [2.41] [1.05] [-0.06] 
2002 0.000 0.005 -0.005 0.001 0.003 -0.006* 
 
[-0.00] [0.65] [-0.48] [0.20] [0.89] [-2.21] 
2003 Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
2004 0.023* 0.030* 0.032* 0.010* 0.011* 0.006* 
 
[2.33] [2.27] [2.47] [2.20] [2.14] [1.97] 
2005 0.036** 0.040* 0.046** 0.016** 0.016* 0.009* 
 
[3.15] [2.52] [2.88] [3.08] [2.45] [2.52] 
2006 0.068*** 0.067** 0.067*** 0.029*** 0.027*** 0.016*** 
 
[4.22] [3.26] [3.35] [4.38] [3.32] [3.57] 
2007 0.110*** 0.118*** 0.103*** 0.048*** 0.046*** 0.025*** 
 
[4.68] [4.09] [3.91] [5.25] [4.31] [4.58] 
2008 0.111*** 0.139*** 0.118*** 0.048*** 0.053*** 0.028*** 
 
[5.00] [4.85] [4.52] [5.60] [5.13] [5.19] 
2009 0.012 -0.049** -0.066** 0.005 -0.019** -0.018** 
 
[0.99] [-2.78] [-2.83] [0.85] [-2.69] [-3.18] 
2010 0.053** 0.041 0.032 0.021** 0.012 0.008 
 
[3.07] [1.91] [1.66] [2.88] [1.43] [1.76] 
2011 0.063** 0.066** 0.025 0.023** 0.018* 0.007 
 
[3.02] [2.83] [1.18] [2.84] [2.16] [1.54] 
2012 0.042* 0.061** 0.006 0.015* 0.017* 0.003 
 
[2.55] [3.26] [0.26] [2.33] [2.38] [0.58] 
2013 0.028 0.031 -0.017 0.009 0.008 -0.005 
 
[1.73] [1.63] [-0.79] [1.46] [1.15] [-1.02] 
N 173,951 145,259 145,259 479,113 389,589 389,589 
R-sq 0.001 0.003 0.109 0.005 0.007 0.409 
t-statistics in brackets; *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
 1 
 
Table A1 continued 
 
 
Low  season 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 Gearing Gearing Gearing Bonus share Bonus share Bonus share 
Sample: All BSD-linked BSD-linked All BSD-linked BSD-linked 
Controls: No No Yes No No Yes 
2000 0.008 0.012*** 0.012** 0.004 0.005*** 0.007*** 
 
[1.95] [3.56] [3.08] [1.91] [3.47] [3.92] 
2001 0.004 0.007* 0.005 0.003 0.004** 0.003** 
 
[1.12] [2.55] [1.63] [1.56] [3.05] [2.62] 
2002 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 
 
[0.18] [0.96] [0.04] [0.41] [1.18] [0.32] 
2003 Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
2004 0.005* 0.005* 0.005* 0.003 0.002 0.003* 
 
[1.98] [2.05] [2.26] [1.90] [1.88] [2.53] 
2005 0.010** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.005* 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 
[2.63] [3.62] [3.84] [2.55] [3.68] [3.89] 
2006 0.021*** 0.020*** 0.018*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 
 
[4.48] [5.00] [4.54] [4.48] [5.05] [4.64] 
2007 0.027*** 0.023*** 0.020*** 0.014*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 
 
[5.09] [5.38] [4.79] [5.33] [5.49] [4.75] 
2008 0.020*** 0.022*** 0.017*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.007*** 
 
[4.23] [5.00] [4.04] [4.54] [4.87] [3.85] 
2009 0.010* 0.009 0.005 0.004* 0.002 0.001 
 
[2.20] [1.82] [1.00] [2.00] [1.19] [0.36] 
2010 0.007 0.011* 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.000 
 
[1.32] [2.17] [0.86] [0.68] [1.04] [0.20] 
2011 0.020** 0.026*** 0.016** 0.008* 0.008** 0.004 
 
[2.76] [3.88] [2.83] [2.45] [2.78] [1.82] 
2012 0.020** 0.025*** 0.013** 0.008** 0.008*** 0.004* 
 
[3.05] [4.80] [2.88] [2.86] [3.83] [2.24] 
N 304,073 264,904 264,904 889,673 759,490 759,490 
R-sq 0.001 0.002 0.048 0.002 0.001 0.100 
t-statistics in brackets; *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
Source: Monthly Wages and Salaries Survey (Jan 2000 – Mar 2013) 
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ENDNOTES 
 
                                                 
i The WERS survey, in contrast, offers only two time points since 2000 (i.e. 2004 and 2011). The MWSS 
therefore offers considerable advantages in terms of being able to observe the periodicity and cyclicality of PRP. 
ii As Prendergast notes (1999: 10), where a worker is paid a fixed salary in a given period “despite the fact that 
there is no immediate relation between pay and performance, he is likely to have incentives to exert effort 
because good performance will improve future contracts. Such reputational concerns imply that effort exertion 
can occur without explicit pay-for-performance contracts.”   
iii In agency theory the standard assumption is that firms are risk neutral while workers are risk averse. The 
choice of contract involves a trade-off between efficiency and insurance. With a fixed wage the worker is fully 
insured and exerts minimal effort, thus reducing efficiency. In a piece-rate contract the worker bears all the risk 
(no insurance), while eliciting higher effort and receiving higher earnings. Where output can vary stochastically 
workers will seek compensation for higher risk when moving from a fixed-wage to a piece-rate contract. In 
practice, most incentive pay schemes involve the combination of a base wage, which is fixed, and a variable 
component (Prendergast, 2000 and 2002a and 2002b). 
iv The changing composition of the workforce accounts for almost one-third of the growth in PRP in the United 
States during the early 2000s, whereas all the growth in PRP in Europe occurs within-group (Bryson et al., 
2013). 
v Van Wanrooy et al. (2013) note a high incidence of pay freezes in the public and private sectors since the onset 
of recession which is consistent with greater cyclicality in earnings more generally. 
vi For weekly-paid employees, the survey asks for total pay paid to employees in the last week of the month.  
vii Note that the high season for 2000 is not a full season because it omits December 1999. 
viii The controls are industry sector; base pay per employee (quartiles); foreign-ownership; legal status; age; 
organisation size - employment; organisation size - number of sites; region. 
ix For each dependent variable, Table A1 first presents estimates for the full sample used in all figures presented 
above, in which the only regressors are the year dummies (see columns 1 and 4). Table A1 then goes on to 
present estimates from the BSD-linked sample without controls and with the removal of all imputed values in 
MWSS (columns 2 and 5). The imputations are undertaken by the ONS, which uses real and imputed values in 
its construction of its measure of Average Weekly Earnings (ONS, 2011).These estimates then provide the 
benchmark for a more complete specification - presented in columns 3 and 6 - in which a range of firm 
characteristics taken from MWSS and the BSD are added in order to strip the year dummies of the effects of 
compositional change. 
x This seems to be largely to do with removing the influence of industry. Finance accounts for a slightly larger 
share of wage-weighted employment between 2003 and 2007 and, although there are more sizeable shifts 
elsewhere (e.g. decline of manufacturing, growth of the education and health sectors), these are much less 
important than Finance in terms of bonus paying. A small increase in the size of the Finance sector is sufficient 
to make a sizeable impact on the overall trend.  
xi Full results are provided in Table 5 of [reference omitted for blind refereeing – see supplementary file 
provided with text for the purposes of review]. 
